IRON DOOR

SECURITY AND PROTECTIVE SERVICES LTD.

Physical Security Risk, Threat and Vulnerability Assessment

Northgate Supplies Ltd
Trade counter, warehouse and yard
Light industrial estate, Trinidad

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SPECIMEN DOCUMENT
Northgate Supplies Ltd is a fictional company. This report was written to show the structure, depth and tone of an Iron Door assessment deliverable. It describes no real premises and no real client. No confidential client material appears anywhere in this document.

Prepared for	Operations Director, Northgate Supplies Ltd (fictional)
Prepared by	Iron Door Security and Protective Services Ltd.
Report reference	IDS-RA-SPEC-001
Assessment type	Full site — day and night observation
Assessment team	Lead Assessor; Assessor (CCTV)
Version	1.0 — specimen
Classification	PUBLIC. This is a demonstration document. A real Iron Door report is issued CONFIDENTIAL — CLIENT EYES ONLY, since it describes exploitable weaknesses in a specific premises.

1. Executive Summary

Iron Door conducted a physical security risk, threat and vulnerability assessment of the Northgate Supplies premises — a trade counter, warehouse and open yard on a light industrial estate. The assessment covered the surrounding environment, the perimeter, the building exterior, and the interior, and included a night visit to evaluate lighting and after-hours conditions.

The overall picture is a site built for goods movement rather than for control. Nearly every weakness found traces back to a single habit: convenience arrangements made during trading hours are never reversed at close of business.

The yard gate is chocked open through the working day so forklifts can move between the warehouse and the container store. The side pedestrian door is propped for the same reason. Neither is formally closed at shift end — closing depends on whoever leaves last noticing. On the night visit, both were found secured, but by different means than the daytime arrangement implies, and no record exists of who performed the check on any given night.

Fourteen vulnerabilities were identified and rated. Six carry a risk rating of High or above and are assigned a 30-day action window. Two of the recommended actions carry no cost at all and can be implemented within a week.

Overall residual risk rating: HIGH

This rating reflects the combination of a site holding high-value, easily resold stock; a perimeter that is defeated daily by its own operating routine; and a detection capability that records events rather than interrupting them. The rating is not a judgement of the staff, who were observed to be diligent within the arrangements they have been given.

The five findings that matter most

Detection is retrospective. Camera coverage is adequate for reviewing an incident after the fact and inadequate for interrupting one. No camera is monitored in real time outside trading hours.

The perimeter is defeated by routine. The yard gate and side door are open for operational convenience for most of the working day, and their closure at shift end is informal and unrecorded.

Stock most attractive to theft is least controlled. Copper cable, power tools and fixings — the items with the strongest resale market — are stored nearest the loading bay, the point of easiest removal.

Cash handling follows a fixed and observable pattern. Banking runs occur on the same days, at approximately the same time, by the same route, on foot, by the same two members of staff.

Nothing is written down. There is no incident log, no key register, no closing checklist and no record of who holds which credential. Where a control exists, it exists in someone's memory.

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2. Scope, Objectives and Methodology

2.1 Objectives

• Establish how the site actually behaves in operating and off-hours conditions, as distinct from how it is intended to behave.

• Identify vulnerabilities in the physical security posture and match each to a credible threat.

• Rate each resulting risk by likelihood and impact on a consistent scale.

• Deliver a ranked, costed remediation schedule the client can act on without further consultancy.

2.2 Scope

The assessment covered four zones: the surrounding environment and approach (Zone 0), the site perimeter (Zone 1), the building exterior and yard (Zone 2), and the building envelope and interior (Zone 3). Cash handling procedure, key control, credential issuance and closing routine were assessed as cross-cutting themes.

Explicitly out of scope: information security, network and systems security, personnel vetting, insider threat investigation, and fire or life-safety compliance. These are named so the client is not left assuming coverage that was never provided.

2.3 Methodology

Iron Door's five-phase assessment method was applied: scoping interview; daylight site survey; night survey; analysis against a documented threat profile; and reporting with a debrief. Observations were recorded photographically where doing so did not itself create a security record risk.

Vulnerability identification followed a zone-by-zone walk of the site. Each observation was tested against the question: what would an adversary with modest capability and local knowledge actually do with this?

2.4 Assessment Conditions

The daylight survey was conducted during normal trading, with deliveries in progress. The night survey was conducted after close of business in dry conditions. Staff were aware an assessment was taking place; no covert testing was conducted.

2.5 Limitations

This assessment reflects conditions observed on the assessment dates. It is not a guarantee against loss. Areas not accessible at the time of survey are noted in the findings. No penetration testing, lock manipulation or social engineering was performed.

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3. Site and Environmental Context (Zone 0)

The premises occupy a corner plot on a light industrial estate with mixed occupancy — light manufacturing, storage and two vacant units. The estate road carries moderate commercial traffic during working hours and is effectively deserted after 18:00. There is no estate-wide security provision, no barrier at the estate entrance, and no shared CCTV.

The rear boundary adjoins an undeveloped lot with heavy vegetation. This provides an approach that is unobserved from any occupied building and unlit at night. The vegetation also provides concealment for a person waiting.

Two of the surrounding units are vacant. Vacant neighbours reduce natural surveillance in both directions and are worth monitoring: a change of occupancy either side materially changes this assessment.

4. Threat Assessment

4.1 Threat Profile

T-01	Opportunistic theft of stock by an intruder after hours	High	High-value, easily resold stock; unobserved rear approach; no real-time detection.
T-02	Theft during trading hours from the yard or loading bay	High	Gate and side door held open; no challenge routine for unfamiliar vehicles.
T-03	Robbery of the banking run	Medium	Fixed day, time, route and personnel; predictable to anyone watching for two weeks.
T-04	Internal shrinkage	Medium	No stock reconciliation at shift change; no key register; unmonitored loading bay.
T-05	Vehicle-borne removal of bulk stock	Medium	Yard accommodates a vehicle; gate open; no gate log.
T-06	Vandalism or arson	Low	No known grievance; concealed rear approach nonetheless provides opportunity.

4.2 Prior Incident

Management reported one prior loss: a quantity of copper cable removed from the yard overnight approximately eighteen months before the assessment. The loss was discovered the following morning during a stock check. Camera footage existed but was reviewed three days later, by which time the retention window had partly overwritten.

The material point is not the loss but the response. The system recorded the event and nobody was alerted. The same conditions persist today. A repeat would produce the same outcome.

5. Vulnerability Assessment

Fourteen vulnerabilities were identified across the four zones. Each carries a reference used consistently through the risk register and remediation schedule.

V-01	1	Yard gate chocked open during trading hours; no challenge routine for entering vehicles.
V-02	1	Rear boundary fence 1.8m, no anti-climb treatment, adjoins concealed undeveloped lot.
V-03	1	No signage indicating surveillance, access restriction or site ownership.
V-04	2	Side pedestrian door propped during trading; closure at shift end informal and unrecorded.
V-05	2	Loading bay unobserved from the trade counter and not covered by any camera at a useful angle.
V-06	2	Yard lighting on a manual switch; found off during the night visit.
V-07	2	Two exterior lamps failed; no scheduled lamp replacement.
V-08	3	Camera coverage adequate for review, inadequate for identification — no eye-level camera at any entry point.
V-09	3	Recorder located in an unlocked office accessible from the trade counter.
V-10	3	Retention period approximately 9 days; not verified against any documented requirement.
V-11	3	High-value stock (copper, power tools, fixings) stored adjacent to the loading bay.
V-12	3	No key register; keys to the container store held informally by at least four staff.
V-13	3	Banking run on a fixed day and time, on foot, by the same two staff, by the same route.
V-14	3	No incident log, no closing checklist, no record of credential issuance.

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6. Risk Assessment

6.1 Rating Method

Each vulnerability is matched to a credible threat and rated for likelihood and impact on a five-point scale. The product gives a risk rating band, which in turn sets the action window. This keeps a broken latch on a back gate from being weighed the same as an unlocked recorder.

Bands: 1–4 Low (routine) · 5–9 Medium (90 days) · 10–14 High (30 days) · 15–25 Critical (immediate).

R-01	V-01, V-05	T-02	4	4	16	Critical	Immediate
R-02	V-08, V-10	T-01	4	4	16	Critical	Immediate
R-03	V-11	T-01	4	3	12	High	30 days
R-04	V-04, V-14	T-04	3	4	12	High	30 days
R-05	V-02	T-01	3	4	12	High	30 days
R-06	V-13	T-03	3	4	12	High	30 days
R-07	V-06, V-07	T-01	4	2	8	Medium	90 days
R-08	V-12	T-04	3	3	9	Medium	90 days
R-09	V-09	T-01	2	4	8	Medium	90 days
R-10	V-03	T-06	2	2	4	Low	Routine

Note on the two Critical ratings. Both describe the same underlying condition from different angles: the site can be entered without challenge, and entry will be recorded but not noticed. Addressed together, the residual rating drops from High to Medium. Addressed separately, neither alone achieves that.

7. Recommended Controls

7.1 Priority 1 — Immediate (0–30 days)

1. Convert detection from retrospective to real time. Enable motion-triggered alerts on the yard and loading bay cameras, routed to a nominated phone outside trading hours. The existing recorder supports this; the function is not enabled. *Indicative cost: nil to low — configuration of existing equipment.*

2. Institute a documented closing routine. A single laminated checklist at the side door: gate closed and locked, side door closed and locked, yard lighting on, recorder confirmed running, signed and dated by the person closing. *Indicative cost: nil.*

3. Move high-value stock away from the loading bay. Relocate copper, power tools and fixings to the rear of the warehouse, behind the trade counter sightline. This is a shelving reorganisation, not a build. *Indicative cost: nil — labour only.*

4. Break the pattern on the banking run. Vary day, time, route and personnel. Where volume justifies it, move to a collection service. Nothing about the current arrangement requires more than two weeks' observation to predict. *Indicative cost: nil, or service fee if collection is adopted.*

5. Install an eye-level identification camera at the trade counter entrance and at the yard gate. Existing coverage shows that a person was present. It does not show who. *Indicative cost: moderate — two cameras and installation.*

6. Fit anti-climb treatment to the rear boundary and clear the vegetation line where it falls within the boundary. The concealed approach is the single largest contributor to R-05. *Indicative cost: moderate.*

7. Secure the recorder. Relocate to a lockable cabinet or a lockable room. A recorder an intruder can remove is a recorder that documents nothing. *Indicative cost: low.*

7.2 Priority 2 — Short Term (30–90 days)

8. Establish a key register. Every key and credential recorded against a named holder, with issue and return dates and a quarterly audit.

9. Formalise lighting maintenance. Scheduled lamp replacement rather than replacement on failure, and move yard lighting from manual switch to photocell or timer.

10. Install site signage. Surveillance notice, access restriction and site ownership at the gate and the estate approach. Signage displaces the casual opportunist at negligible cost.

11. Review recorder retention against a stated requirement. Nine days is a hardware default, not a decision. Decide what the retention period should be and configure to it.

12. Introduce a vehicle challenge routine. Any vehicle entering the yard is greeted and its purpose established. This is a habit, not a system.

7.3 Priority 3 — Medium Term (90 days +)

13. Access control audit — review credential issuance and conduct a full reconciliation against current staff.

14. Establish a documented incident response and post-incident review procedure.

15. Conduct annual reassessment, and reassess on any material change — including a change of occupancy in the adjoining units.

16. Consider extending scope to insider threat and stock reconciliation, which fall outside this assessment.

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8. Conclusion

Northgate Supplies operates a site that works well for moving goods and poorly for controlling access. That is a common and entirely correctable position, and it is not the result of negligence — it is the result of operational arrangements that were sensible when introduced and have never been reviewed as a whole.

The single most valuable change is also among the cheapest: enabling alerting on equipment already installed, so that the system interrupts rather than merely records. Combined with a written closing routine and the relocation of high-value stock — neither of which costs anything — the site's residual risk moves from High to Medium inside thirty days.

The remaining Priority 1 items require modest expenditure and should follow. Priority 2 and 3 items build the documentation and review habits that keep the position from drifting back.

What Iron Door would do next

• Client review of this draft and correction of any factual error.

• A short debrief with the responsible manager to talk through the ranked list and agree sequencing.

• Issue of the final version incorporating any corrections.

• Verification visit at 90 days to confirm implementation and re-rate the residual risk.

This is a specimen. Northgate Supplies Ltd does not exist. The site, findings and figures were written to demonstrate the structure and depth of an Iron Door assessment report. A real report is issued CONFIDENTIAL — CLIENT EYES ONLY and is never published.

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